Les conférences ont lieu le jeudi à 18 h 15 en B108.
- 21 octobre : Roberto Keller (Genève, normativité) – « Les analyses attitudinales des valeurs »
Il est devenu courant d’analyser des concepts évaluatifs tels que l’admirable, l’amusant ou l’offensant à travers des concepts d’attitudes évaluatives comme l’admiration, l’amusement ou la colère. Par exemple, selon certains philosophes, juger qu’une chose est admirable c’est juger qu’il est approprié de l’admirer. Cette analyse est particulièrement prometteuse car elle peut rendre compte de certains aspects centraux de ces concepts. Dans cette présentation, j’exposerai les arguments les plus importants en faveur de cette théorie ainsi que les problèmes que l’on doit résoudre pour que cette dernière puisse réellement éclaircir notre compréhension des valeurs. - 11 novembre : Matthieu Queloz (Oxford, métaphilosophie) – « Reverse-Engineering the Points of Concepts through Pragmatic Genealogy »
Though conceptual engineering is a forward-looking enterprise, the thought has been gaining traction that it should be guided by a prior understanding of the functions or points that our concepts serve. In this talk, I explore some of the motivations for this backward-looking enterprise of conceptual reverse-engineering, and I argue that there is an under-appreciated tradition which offers a methodologically controlled way of doing conceptual reverse-engineering: the tradition of pragmatic genealogy. I contend that pragmatic genealogy is particularly well suited to dealing with two kinds of conceptual practices in particular: those exhibiting what I call self-effacing functionality, and those that are historically inflected to such a degree that they lack a paradigm case displaying the practice’s connection to human needs. By enabling us to reverse-engineer the points of concepts even then, pragmatic genealogy earns its place in our methodological repertoire. - 25 novembre en L208 et sur Zoom : Maria Alvarez (Londres, action) – « Acting as Causing Change »
I defend a version of the causal view of agency according to which to act is to exercise causal powers, against two recent objections. One is that causal views of agency cannot accommodate the Aristotelian insight that ‘action and passion are two aspects of a single material reality’ (Ford 2014: 15). In rebutting the first objection I clarify how we should consider the relationship between actions and their results, touching briefly on some advantages of this understanding concerning how to locate actions in time and space. The second objection is that a causal view of agency cannot account for actions in progress. In rebutting this second objection, I develop the view to accommodate questions arising from the possibility of ‘unfinished actions’ and ‘mere activity’.
Draft de l’article de la conférencière disponible sur demande.
Meeting ID: 651 7404 2107
Passcode: 421419 - 16 décembre : Hamid Taieb (Berlin, couleurs)
Les conférences de ce semestre sont organisées par Robin, Romolo et Julie.
PhilEAs 