Conférences PhilEAs – Printemps 2022

Les conférences ont lieu le jeudi à 18 h 15 en B108.


  • 24 mars: Julia Langkau (Genève, philosophie de la créativité) – « What is Creativity? »
    According to a widely-accepted definition originally provided by Margaret Boden, creativity is the ability to come up with ideas or artefacts that are new relative to some comparison class, that are surprising or unexpected, and that are in some way or other valuable, appropriate or useful. While this definition focuses on the creative product, our main interest when it comes to creativity is often a conscious and valuable imaginative process. This paper argues that current approaches to creativity blend together two different notions of creativity which should be kept apart: product creativity and process creativity. If we distinguish these two notions, we can resolve some conceptual tensions concerning creativity and explain better how animals, artificial intelligence generated art and inventions, children’s drawings, and exceptional humans can all be called ‘creative’.
  • 14 avril: Lorenzo Cocco (Genève, philosophie des sciences) – « Le Platonisme naturalisé »
    De quoi la réalité autour de nous est-elle faite ? Beaucoup diraient principalement d’entités physiques comme les quarks, les électrons ou les champs quantiques ; certains disent aussi de qualités mentales irréductibles, comme les saveurs et les douleurs (et quelques-uns ajoutent encore les entités surnaturelles). Dans ce talk, je vais donner une introduction à un argument célèbre des philosophes américains Willard Van Orman Quine et Hilary Putnam qui vise à montrer que, parmi les constituants fondamentaux de la réalité, on retrouve aussi des entités platoniques abstraites, comme les nombres, les fonctions et les ensembles. Je vais présenter une version originale de l’argument et je vais montrer que, contrairement à ce que disent les philosophes, cet argument est très puissant. La seule manière que je vois de le contrer serait de reformuler toute la physique, de bout en comble, de l’optique des lasers à la matière condensée, jusqu’aux nouvelles théories de la gravité quantique.
  • 28 avril: Giovanni Merlo (Genève, métaphysique) – « Introspection as a (limiting) case of perception »
    The question of how we gain knowledge of our own mental states is one of the central questions in the contemporary philosophical debate about the mind. One especially divisive issue, in this connection, is the extent to which self-knowledge can be conceived of on the model of perception: Do we know our own mental states in broadly the same way in which we know the ‘outer’ world through the senses? Or is self-knowledge fundamentally unlike perception? In this talk, I will explore an approach to these questions that tries to accommodate the most important reasons for and against assimilating introspection to perception. On the approach I favour, not all introspection is perceptual. And among the cases of introspection that are properly conceived as perceptual, at least some are best regarded as ‘limiting cases’ of perception.
  • 12 mai: Sven Rosenkranz (Barcelone, métaphysique) – « Epistemic justification and being in a position to know »
  • I introduce the account of epistemic justification I recently defended at book-length (Justification as Ignorance, OUP, 2021). According to this account, one has propositional justification for p iff one is in no position to rule out that one is in a position to know p. After a first elucidation of the notion of being in a position to know, I address a challenge put to me by Daniel Waxman. Waxman alleges that my account of justification succumbs to counterexamples. In response, I argue that Waxman makes certain controversial assumptions concerning the notion of being in a position to know that I can coherently reject. On the alternative construal of the notion, Waxman’s strategy to produce counterexamples founders. This construal has, however, repercussions for another thesis I defend, viz. that propositional justification is luminous. Time permitting, I indicate what more needs to be argued to avert a corresponding threat to the latter thesis.

Les conférences de ce semestre sont organisées par Robin, Romolo et Julie.

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