Conférences PhilEAs – Automne 2021

Les conférences ont lieu le jeudi à 18 h 15 en B108.

  • 21 octobre : Roberto Keller (Genève, normativité) – « Les analyses attitudinales des valeurs »
    Il est devenu courant d’analyser des concepts évaluatifs tels que l’admirable, l’amusant ou l’offensant à travers des concepts d’attitudes évaluatives comme l’admiration, l’amusement ou la colère. Par exemple, selon certains philosophes, juger qu’une chose est admirable c’est juger qu’il est approprié de l’admirer. Cette analyse est particulièrement prometteuse car elle peut rendre compte de certains aspects centraux de ces concepts. Dans cette présentation, j’exposerai les arguments les plus importants en faveur de cette théorie ainsi que les problèmes que l’on doit résoudre pour que cette dernière puisse réellement éclaircir notre compréhension des valeurs.
  • 11 novembre : Matthieu Queloz (Oxford, métaphilosophie) – « Reverse-Engineering the Points of Concepts through Pragmatic Genealogy »
    Though conceptual engineering is a forward-looking enterprise, the thought has been gaining traction that it should be guided by a prior understanding of the functions or points that our concepts serve. In this talk, I explore some of the motivations for this backward-looking enterprise of conceptual reverse-engineering, and I argue that there is an under-appreciated tradition which offers a methodologically controlled way of doing conceptual reverse-engineering: the tradition of pragmatic genealogy. I contend that pragmatic genealogy is particularly well suited to dealing with two kinds of conceptual practices in particular: those exhibiting what I call self-effacing functionality, and those that are historically inflected to such a degree that they lack a paradigm case displaying the practice’s connection to human needs. By enabling us to reverse-engineer the points of concepts even then, pragmatic genealogy earns its place in our methodological repertoire.
  • 25 novembre : Maria Alvarez (Londres, action) – « Acting as Causing Change »
    I defend a version of the causal view of agency according to which to act is to exercise causal powers, against two recent objections. One is that causal views of agency cannot accommodate the Aristotelian insight that ‘action and passion are two aspects of a single material reality’ (Ford 2014: 15). In rebutting the first objection I clarify how we should consider the relationship between actions and their results, touching briefly on some advantages of this understanding concerning how to locate actions in time and space. The second objection is that a causal view of agency cannot account for actions in progress. In rebutting this second objection, I develop the view to accommodate questions arising from the possibility of ‘unfinished actions’ and ‘mere activity’.
  • 16 décembre : Hamid Taieb (Berlin, couleurs) – « Early Phenomenologists on the Non-subjectivity of Colours »
    This paper aims to present and evaluate the discussions about the (non-)subjectivity of colours in early phenomenology. Members of this tradition (which includes Alexander Pfänder, Adolf Reinach, and Edith Stein, among others) were opposed to the idea that colours are “subjective” in the sense of “psychic”. They claimed that colours, as regards their nature or essence, are physical. It might be the case that the colours that we human beings see do not exist, but this non-existence does not imply any change in the essence of colours: they do not become psychic due to this, but just non-existent physical entities. While some early phenomenologists took an additional step, and defended realism about colours, others seemed to remain neutral about their existence. I briefly discuss the arguments given in favour of realism, while also pointing out some interesting philosophical consequences of the neutral position.

Les conférences de ce semestre sont organisées par Robin, Romolo et Julie.

Votre commentaire

Entrez vos coordonnées ci-dessous ou cliquez sur une icône pour vous connecter:


Vous commentez à l’aide de votre compte Déconnexion /  Changer )

Image Twitter

Vous commentez à l’aide de votre compte Twitter. Déconnexion /  Changer )

Photo Facebook

Vous commentez à l’aide de votre compte Facebook. Déconnexion /  Changer )

Connexion à %s